Idealization is ubiquitous in scientific practice, yet there is little consensus in the extant philosophical literature on some of the most basic questions about idealization, such as: What exactly constitutes idealization? Is idealization compatible with realism? Are idealization and abstraction distinct? Should theorists work to eliminate idealizations as science progresses? Are there rules governing the rational use of idealization, or should a theorist's intuition alone guide the process? We would like to see more sustained philosophical analysis directed at these and related questions. To help accomplish this, we will assemble a small group of philosophers from diverse backgrounds for in depth discussion about the philosophical questions related to idealization. The workshop will be organized to maximize discussion time and to ensure that novel material about idealization is given maximum time for discussion. We are especially interested to discuss the more epistemological aspects of idealization, with a lesser emphasis on the detailed case studies that have dominated much of the recent literature.

The workshop is organized by Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg) and Michael Weisberg (Penn).