The workshop takes place on 24 October 2008 in room C186 (Ruth First auditorium) at Tilburg University. For directions, click here.

Some Thoughts on Explanatory Pluralism
Jochen Apel, University of Heidelberg and TiLPS

Since the seminal work of Carl Gustav Hempel philosophers of science have struggled to find an adequate model of scientific explanation. A position which claims that there is only one such model and therefore only one genuine type of explanation can be called explanatory monism. But after decades of philosophical debate no compelling form of explanatory monism could have been established. Therefore we might look for an alternative to explanatory monism, i.e. for some kind of explanatory pluralism. This is a position which acknowledges that there are different genuine types of explanation. But how could such a position be spelled out in more detail? How do different types of explanation relate and which (if any) epistemic merits might it have to be an explanatory pluralist?

Sober and Hoefer on Objective Probability
Bengt Autzen, LSE

In this paper I will discuss two recent proposals of how to understand the notion of objective probability: Elliott Sober's 'no-theory' theory (NTT) of probability and Carl Hoefer's theory of Humean Objective Chance (HOC). In particular, I will examine Hoefer's criticism of Sober's NTT and discuss whether Hoefer's HOC falls short of the same criticism Hoefer himself puts forward against Sober's NTT.

The Status of Bridge Laws in the Reduction of Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, LSE

There is a broad consensus that statistical mechanics is a reductionist enterprise. Further, it is the Nagelian model of reduction that usually forms the tacit "background philosophy" in statistical mechanics. However, Nagelian reduction is widely criticised; the so called "Churchland-Hooker" model of reduction usually being advocated in its place. I present a critique of the latter, and defend the Nagelian model, in the context of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. The status of bridge laws in the Nagelian model is a pressing matter. I critically examine the concept of temperature as a means by which to shed light on this.

Probabilistic Analysis and Levels of Causality
Isabelle Drouet, IHPST, Paris

Starting with the distinction between generic causality and singular causality, the present paper confronts two questions: i) what is the relationship between these two "levels" of causality? and ii) can generic and/or singular causality be given a probabilistic analysis? More precisely, I will consider the position according to which generic causality, but not singular causality, can be given a probabilistic analysis, I will explain why this position is appealing, and I will examine how this position relates to the more basic of the available conceptions of the relationship between levels of causality. My claim will be that the considered position is hardly compatible with the two conceptions of the relationship between levels of causality that will be taken into account.

A Uniform Treatment of Pronominalization
Arantxa San Gines Ruiz, IHPST, Paris

Our aim will be to show that it is in fact possible to imagine, in contravention of the dominant intuition, an uniform treatment of pronominalization in English. We will conceive pronouns as the device being used by speakers to recover, not elements (e.g. through description, strategy, identity or reference), but 'structures'. Among the several advantages of developing such a structural treatment, we will refer to the possibility of doing a difference between the two following kind of sentence: (i) If Smith owns a donkey, he beats it and (ii) If Smith owns a donkey, Smith beats it. Our analysis will distinguish two levels of interpretation: a first Level that ascribes, as expected, the same meaning to both sentences; and a second level of interpretation connected to structure. It is just in This second level that we will observe a difference between the sentences, difference which does can affect, as we will see, future interpretations at the first level, the level of meaning.

How to Be (and How not to Be) a Bayesian Explanationist
Jonah Schupbach, University of Pittsburgh and TiLPS

Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation both offer models of inductive inference. Prima facie, these two models appear to conflict; nonetheless, recently many philosophers have attempted to reconcile the two. Such Bayesian Explanationists either try to show that these models, while indeed distinct, do not conflict with one another, or they try to show that one of the models reduces logically to the other. In this paper, I survey and critique some of the most prominent strategies that philosophers have adopted to this conciliatory end. I then argue that one strategy is particularly well-suited to merging Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation: the "heuristic" strategy. The heuristic strategy is able to avoid the problems that beset other strategies while maintaining an important role for each model of inference.